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Abstract 
In this chapter we explore the functions of mechanisms in medical practice. Using a group of six 
examples of mechanisms in medicine, we present a pluralist epistemological stance about medical 
mechanisms. We argue that these mechanistic approaches contribute to, rather than constitute, 
inferential practices in various contexts. We conclude that an over-emphasis by philosophers on the 




Our aim in this chapter is to give a ‘functionalist account’ of the ways that mechanisms are sought, 
formulated, and used, in medicine. Rather than giving a single analytic account of mechanism, or a 
review of ways that existing accounts of mechanism fail to describe one or other aspects of medical 
practice, we instead work from a starting position that one of us has previously called the ‘mosaic 
view’ of causality (Illari and Russo 2014). According to this mosaic view, the objective of research by 
practically- and historically-engaged philosophers of science is not to find The-One definition of 
causality, but instead to understand what role related notions play in our epistemologies and 
methodologies. In a similar vein, we here focus on exploring the use of mechanisms in the 
methodologies and epistemologies of medicine. In this we are motivated by (amongst others) 
Andrea Woody's functionalist account of explanation. Her approach is to:  
 
“[…] think about where and when explanations are sought and formulated, 
and subsequently to consider what role(s) they might play in practice.” 
(Woody 2015: 81)  
 
Our aim is to provide a related inquiry, concentrating on the ways that mechanisms are sought, 
formulated, and used, in medicine. We take the main aims of medicine to be to understand and 
intervene on the health of individuals and of populations, where those interventions seek to cure, 
mitigate or prevent disruptions to human health. 
 
Mechanisms, we submit are found to the point of ubiquity in medicine. Because of this, we will use 
six ‘episodes’ to draw out some of the role(s) that mechanisms play in making sense of medicine. In 
section 2, we introduce these episodes in a fairly descriptive way. We then, in section 3, analyse 
these episodes in order to draw lessons about mechanisms in medicine. Finally, in section 4, we 
reach some tentative conclusions about mechanisms in medicine. Here, a major job is to answer the 
following question: if the mechanisms project often or usually looks to the sciences for inspiration, 
why is there such a mis-match between the high prominence of mechanisms in medical practice, and 
the much lower level of attention that medical mechanisms have received from philosophers?  
 
2. Examples of mechanisms in medicine 
 
We begin with what seems a simple fact of the matter: talk of mechanisms are nearly ubiquitous in 
medical practice. This is not to claim that mechanisms are either necessary or sufficient to establish 
the causes and effects of health and disease, but just to notice that mechanisms enter, very, very 
frequently, into several inferential practices in the medical sciences. The interesting question then 
becomes what these different uses of mechanisms have in common or in which respects they differ. 
This is in line with Woody’s functionalist approach.  
 
In order to build our argument for this diversity we present some ‘episodes’ of medical mechanisms 
at work. We borrow from Chang (2011: 110ff) the term ‘episode’, rather than ‘case study’, to 
emphasize these are selected as exemplary cases of the numerous uses of mechanisms in medicine, 
rather than unique instances chosen ad hoc for the purpose of the present discussion. To develop 
this point slightly, we intend to tell a diverse group of stories about the practices of the medical 
sciences, present and historical. Yet we hope that the term ‘episode’ will suggest that, while each 
tells a different story about medicine, that these stories have something in common from the 
perspective of researchers interested in mechanisms. 
 
Recall that we take the main aims of medicine to concern understanding and intervening on the 
health of individuals and of populations. This means we use the term ‘medicine’ to include all clinical, 
scientific, and even political forms of engagement with health and disease (for a detailed discussion, 
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see Clarke and Russo 2016). We therefore use ‘medicine’ as an umbrella term with the aim of 
moving towards a broad and inclusive understanding of medicine which – we hope – will foster a 
thorough discussion of the role of mechanisms in this broad-church medicine. It is in this sense that, 
in this chapter, we explore the applied epistemology of mechanisms in medicine. We submit that 
mechanisms are powerful tools for understanding, establishing and intervening on causal relations in 
medicine. However, we worry that insufficient attention has been paid to the different ways that an 
understanding of mechanisms can contribute to this applied epistemology. Hence, our six episodes. 
 
From the discussion of the episodes it will become clear (i) that mechanisms contribute to, rather 
than constitute, several inferential practices in medicine and (ii) that the effects of these 
contributions are extremely heterogeneous. We will go on to think more analytically about these 
various contributions in section 3. 
 
As a first case, consider aspirin, which has been widely used as analgesic, antipyretic, and anti-
inflammatory since its synthesis by Hoffmann in 1897 (Schrör 1997: 349). Its effects are so well-
known that the example of aspirin is often used by philosophers of medicine to argue that 
mechanisms are not needed to establish causal relations (e.g. Howick 2011: 930). At first sight, the 
argument seems compelling: the efficacy of aspirin as a pain-killer was known for many decades 
before its mechanism of action was understood. Many of us, too, will have taken and trusted aspirin 
to (say) relieve our headache despite (we venture) few of us possessing the knowledge of the 
relevant mechanisms that explained why it was effective. Yet the analgesic, antipyretic, and anti-
inflammatory effects are not the only effects of aspirin of interest to medical practice. Aspirin is 
widely used because of its effect on platelet function. Giving regular low-dose aspirin improves 
cardiovascular outcomes (Antithrombotic Trialists’ Collaboration, 2002). Yet, we argue, this role of 
aspirin is not so perspicuous as its painkilling one. Instead, knowledge of this effect was intimately 
linked to understanding the mechanism by which the drug worked. 
 
We summarise here the main steps of how the effect of aspirin on platelet function was established, 
based on Schrör’s presentation (1997: 349-50). Quick reported that aspirin increased bleeding time 
(which is a measure of the overall rate at which blood clots) in 1967. This was shortly followed by 
several reports that low-dose aspirin appeared to inhibit platelet aggregation – in itself, an 
important part of blood clotting (Weiss, Aledort and Kochawa 1968; O’Brien 1968). This inhibition 
began within two hours of taking the aspirin, and lasted for several days. The investigation this 
impressive degree of platelet aggregation in turn lead to the finding that aspirin inhibited 
prostaglandin synthesis (Vane 1971). Incidentally, this inhibition of prostaglandin biosynthesis was 
later to provide the roots of the mechanistic explanations of the other actions of aspirin. Smith and 
Willis (1971) then identified that the inhibition of prostaglandin biosynthesis was “the mechanism of 
the antiplatelet action of aspirin” (Schrör 1997: 350), which was traced specifically to inhibition of 
the cyclooxygenase (or COX) enzyme in 1975, and to a specific amino acid residue in the COX-1 
enzyme in 1991. Further mechanistic research on COX would reveal routes for future interventions 
that could capitalize on aspirin’s beneficial effects, while hopefully avoiding its adverse effects. 
  
Our second example is HDL-raising drugs. Observational evidence suggests high levels of high-
density lipoprotein (HDL) in the blood are inversely correlated with heart disease. But is this 
correlation due to an underlying causal (preventative) relationship between heart disease and HDL? 
 
How about investigating this question by using HDL-raising as an intervention designed to prevent 
heart disease? A recently-developed class of drugs called cholesteryl ester transfer protein (CETP) 
inhibitors seemed to promise just such an investigation. Clinical trials of the drug torcetrapib seemed 
effective at raising HDL levels (Brousseau et al, 2004). However, it did not improve clinical outcomes. 
In fact, it severely worsened them, leading to the abandoning of a large phase III clinical trial (known 
as ILLUMINATE) in 2006, owing to excess deaths in patients receiving torcetrapib. This result was 
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unexpected – so much so that one commentator suggested that this result should lead us to 
conclude that “We know so much about the cholesterol pathway, but we never seem to know what 
matters” (Lehrer 2011). The trial authors (Barter et al) were unsurprisingly more measured in their 
analysis of the trial result, and responded with some educated speculation as to its cause(s): 
 
“[…]Clinical trials such as ours are not designed to elucidate mechanisms of 
either benefit or harm associated with the use of a drug. However, they 
may provide clues that have the potential to inform future research… 
There are at least two possible explanations for the observation of 
increased mortality and morbidity associated with the use of torcetrapib in 
our study: an off-target effect of torcetrapib, unrelated to CETP inhibition, 
and an adverse effect of CETP inhibition per se, with the possible 
generation of dysfunctional or even proatherogenic HDL cholesterol.” 
(Barter et al 2007) 
 
Further research has suggested that the “off-target” mechanism suggested by Barter et al may be 
correct. It appears that torcetrapib increases blood pressure (Tall, Yvan-Charvet and Wang 2007) – 
itself, a well-known cause of cardiac death. If that is the case, then the increased mortality and 
morbidity found in the ILLUMINATE trial appear to be an adverse consequence of torcetrapib 
specifically, and therefore unlikely to be replicated in clinical research on alternative CETP inhibitors 
(such as evacetrapib and anacetrapib).   
 
The third example is that asbestos is known to be responsible for fatal diseases such as asbestosis 
and lung cancer. The biochemical mechanisms that connect exposure to asbestos fibres with the 
development of cancer have been studied and examined carefully (see e.g. IARC Working Group 
2012). However, work remains to be done studying the (largely social) mechanisms by which 
exposure to asbestos occurs. For example, occupational medicine researchers have been studying 
the disease from the perspective of the work place. This led to study populations living close to 
asbestos factories. Examples abound across different geographical locations. We might mention, for 
instance, Barking in the United Kingdom (Greenberg, 2003) and Eternit in Italy, for which a 
memorable sentence was issued in 2009 after a long and difficult trial (Mossano, 2011; Allen and 
Kazan-Allen, 2012): the owners of the asbestos multinational were deemed guilty of fraudulent 
environmental disaster and omission. In this context, and because of their bearing on legal and 
policy questions, some aspects of the mechanisms underlying asbestos exposure remain disputed, 
for instance latency (see, e.g., Terracini et al., 2014; La Vecchia and Boffetta, 2014). The point here is 
that mechanisms investigated via occupational and environmental epidemiology largely do not 
concern the way that asbestos causes asbestosis.  This, as we shall further discuss later, poses a 
question for the ‘overbiologizations’ of diseases, namely the reduction of disease causation to 
biochemical reactions in the body.  
 
In the philosophy of medicine our fourth example, the discovery of Helicobacter pylori as a cause of 
gastric ulcer, has been used to illustrate how hypotheses are generated in medicine (Gillies 2005; 
Hutton 2012; Thagard 1998a, 1998b). The same episode has also been used to illustrate the mutual 
need of evidence of difference-making and of mechanisms in establishing causal claims in medicine 
(Russo and Williamson 2007). This body of literature showcased how the use of mechanisms in given 
inferential practices also depends on the available theoretical framework. In this case, available 
background knowledge had it that bacteria could not live in acid environments such as the stomach. 
This tended to preclude the hypothesis that H.pylori could be a cause of gastric ulcer, and until the 
mechanism by which this bacteria could survive in low-pH environments had been investigated, the 




Another stock example in the philosophy of medicine, and our fifth, is the story of Ignaz Semmelweis, 
a doctor active in nineteen-century Vienna. His notoriety is due to his hypothesis that puerperal 
fever was due to some infection. The mechanisms had not been clarified at that time, but his 
suggested preventive intervention was remarkably simple: doctors should wash their hands after 
performing autopsies and before assisting women in labour. Part of the debate in philosophy of 
medicine concerns the question whether the scientific community was right or wrong in rejecting 
Semmelweis’ precautionary measure on the basis of available evidence and of the theoretical 
framework supporting the intervention. 
 
The sixth and final episode we want to present is the comparison between approaches to health and 
disease. This becomes highly relevant in times where the public is showing skepticism and mistrust 
for so-called ‘Western medicine’ and increasingly seek advice from ‘alternative’ approaches. 
‘Alternative’ or ‘complementary’ medicine is however a basket where too often anything that is 
‘non-Western’ is placed. Instead care is needed in carry out comparisons and non-Western medical 
traditions ought not to be conflated. 
 
To illustrate the relevance of our point, we rely on the contribution of Hugh Shapiro in the volume 
Medicine across cultures (Shapiro 2003). Shapiro provides an invaluable contextualization of what is 
usually called ‘Chinese medicine’, including a brief history of its relation to Western approaches. 
Shapiro then explains that from a practice of forensic medicine and of dissection, which was 
common to both Chinese and Western approaches, very different conceptualizations of the body 
(anatomy and physiology) and of pathology derived. Moreover, this led to very different 
developments: the study of the living body in Chinese medicine and the study of the dead body in 
Western medicine. Shapiro illustrates these claims with the case of ‘nerves’.  
 
At the beginning of the last century the medical community gathered to translate and standardize 
terms coming from the West. It became clear that there wasn’t a one-to-one correspondence. For 
instance, Chinese lacked both the concept and the word for ‘nerve’. Since the Renaissance, attempts 
to translate Western medical concepts into Chinese ones had to make recourse to periphrases and 
to neologisms that would make sense in their conceptual framework. Thus, for instance, nerve was 
used much as synonymous of sinew, and its function was to transmit the ‘vital power’. Chinese 
doctors have known for long how to intervene on this vital power, using the technique of 
acupuncture. The lack of a corresponding term for ‘nerve’ in Chinese testifies, argues Shapiro, to the 
different conceptions and understanding of the body and of the phenomena of health and disease. 
This, it should be noted, holds for Western culture too. In fact, Shapiro continues, in the West the 
understanding of what nerves are and of how they function has been related to the character trait of 
‘volition’, an idea that traces back to Greek medicine. Moreover, this is intimately connected with 
action and especially volitional actions, which are defining features of identity.    
 
 
3. Mechanisms contribute to inferences in medicine 
After this overview of episodes of mechanisms in medicine, it would be tempting to try and pin 
down The-One definition that fits them all. In accordance with the ‘mosaic view’ and the 
‘functionalist approach’ we espoused (see section 1), we will not pursue this objective here. For our 
purposes, we can safely rely on the working characterization by Jon Williamson and Phyllis Illari:  
 
“A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities 
organized in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon”  




This kind of view is now routinely referred to as ‘minimal mechanism’ (see  also  Chapter 1). This 
characterization avoids equating mechanisms with Cartesian deterministic machines (see Chapter 3). 
Also, this characterization is flexible enough to accommodate mechanisms that travel across generic, 
or population-level case and single, individual case. It allows us to deal with bio-chemical, 
pharmacological, or social mechanisms of health and disease. These and other aspects of 
mechanisms are discussed next.  
 
Returning to our first episode, aspirin, examples like this are instructive in that they illustrate, in a 
concrete way, the difficulties that can be experienced in finding effects in medicine. This is hard – 
effects are complex, and we think that researchers need to know about mechanisms in order to 
reliably find and measure many effects. While there are exceptions - you need no detailed 
knowledge to know that an anaesthetic is effective in sending someone to sleep - it can be 
extremely hard to discover and understand all the clinically relevant effects of an anaesthetic (or, in 
this case, analgesic) drug. This is also the case when it comes to finding side effects (such as gastric 
and duodenal ulcers, Reye’s syndrome, and exacerbations of asthma in the case of aspirin). 
  
The second example, HDL-raising drugs, shows that medical effects of interest may result from 
complex systems of mechanisms that are difficult to separate (like the hypertensive effect of 
torcetrapid). The complexity comes for the interaction of given drugs with a pathology, or rather 
with several pathologies. In fact, cases of co-morbidity (i.e., a patient that has more pathological 
conditions at one time) are the norm rather than the exception. Knowledge of mechanisms is 
necessary to explain, predict, and treat, especially in these cases. Differently put, the situation of one 
drug—one pathology rarely occurs. Knowledge of mechanisms doesn’t come from large clinical trials 
alone (as Barter et al noted in their quote given above), but is instead to be complemented with 
other types of studies, for instance lab experiments. 
 
Cases like the third, asbestos, point to the question whether or not, in the light of the stunning 
advancement of biomedicine, disease ought to be reduced to biochemical reactions in the body. On 
the one hand, in the medical sciences, attention is given to social mechanisms of health and disease, 
but these are often considered ‘distant’, namely as ‘adjunct’ description of how biological 
mechanisms of health and disease correlate with socio-economic difference or inequalities across 
individuals. On the other hand, the sociology of health and the behavioural sciences describe the 
role that social, psychological, economic, or behavioural factors play in the aetiology of disease.  To 
be sure, this is an area where evidence of difference making (that social factors make a difference to 
the occurrence of disease) exceeds evidence of mechanisms (how social factors intervene in the 
mechanisms of disease causation. The philosophy of mechanisms has a chance there in developing 
an account of mixed mechanisms, where both biological and social factors play an active role (Kelly 
et al 2014).  This is not just to elucidate the aetiology of disease, but also to better plan public health 
interventions. In fact, while most (non-communicable) diseases have a proper explanation in terms 
of biochemical mechanisms, successful public health interventions in the past targeted social 
determinates, lifestyles, and basic hygiene or sanitary measures; to be sure, this is still the case 
nowadays, as evidenced by major public health interventions in Brazil (see e.g. Barreto et al, 2010 
and Barreto and Aquino 2009). In a nutshell, bio-social mechanisms of health and disease are 
needed to plan, research, and implement interventions. This is because successful interventions 
need a complex view of what counts as relevantly beneficial or harmful. 
 
The fourth case, H. pylori and gastric ulcer, is interesting in that it shows that mechanisms do not 
function as an ‘experimentum crucis’ for a theory, nor are they ‘deductively’ inferred from available 
theories. The search for explanatory and therapeutic mechanisms requires constant interplay with 
available background knowledge. Hunting for specific mechanisms, like that linking H. pylori 
infection with stomach ulcers, might confirm, or disconfirm existing background knowledge. It is 
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undeniable that experiments depend on mechanisms, more precisely on knowledge of mechanisms. 
However, without standards to assess the quality of knowledge of mechanisms, poor-quality 
assertions and speculation (“the stomach is sterile”) appear to fill the gaps that should instead be 
populated with empirically-based, carefully-researched knowledge about mechanisms. This allows us 
to introduce a normative dimension of the mechanism project in medicine, next to the descriptive 
one carried out in the previous section. Mechanisms support the infrastructure of medical inference. 
To be even more precise, they support a variety of medical inferences at different stages of the 
scientific process. They aren’t just a way of expressing existing knowledge, but instead actively 
participate in producing new knowledge. Mechanisms have a vital role in the setup of trials or of lab 
experiments. And the results of these scientific practices may lend further support to these 
mechanisms, or they may lead us to significantly revise our knowledge base (as Craver and Darden 
2013 suggest). 
 
The fifth case, puerperal fever, is an instructive case for several reasons. One is that we should avoid 
‘presentism’: it is wrong to assess the past with the theories available today. The recent debate on 
evidential pluralism (such as Broadbent 2011)  focuses on whether the scientific community, at the 
time of Semmelweis, was right or wrong in rejecting his preventive measure. The point here is that 
this measure was not supported by solid theoretical background, as this was happing well before the 
germ theory of disease had been developed. Given what we know today about bacteria and so on it 
is too easy a judgment to say that the scientific community at that time was wrong in rejecting 
Semmelweis. The point here is of course broader than just this specific episode. It is a point of 
philosophical methodology and of how to do philosophy of science, properly informed by the history 
of science. Yet much is historically disputed – indeed “misleading” (Tulodziecki 2013: 1074) in the 
Semmelweis case. Another reason why this episode is relevant to us is that, even if the historical 
quarrel cannot be settled, this can provide important lessons about the present. In particular, 
examples like these should encourage reflection on what to do when knowledge of mechanisms is 
incomplete or highly uncertain. What actions are nonetheless justified? This is where proper 
attention to  mechanisms in philosophy of medicine pushes back the frontier of epistemology and of 
methodology. In fact, exquisitely epistemological questions about the (un)certainty of current 
medical knowledge quickly turn into ethico-political questions about what justifies the 
implementation (or refusal) of interventions or preventive measures. A case in point here is the 
current controversy over vaccination programmes. Apart from the disputed question of the 
correlation of vaccines and autism, another question concerns the tension of individual freedom not 
to vaccinate and the public health concern to protect the population at large by imposing vaccines to 
all individuals. 
 
Health, disease and worldviews, the sixth episode, is an area where much work is needed, from a 
philosophical, historical, and also socio-anthropological perspective. These sorts of comparison are 
instructive in that they remind us that mechanisms, their entities and activities, are not given. They 
are instead products of our investigations into the phenomena of health and disease. From an 
epistemological point of view, this means that mechanisms are part of our inferential systems – a 
point that already arose earlier in the reflection on the case of Helicobacter Pylori. But mechanisms 
are a part of our inferential system also in another sense, namely different understandings of the 
phenomena of health and disease may lead to incommensurable mechanisms, or to syndromes that 
are culture-bound (Guarnaccia and Rogler 1999). Thus all these phenomena, as well as the 
investigations and explanations thereof, are deeply couched into cultural factors, in the East as well 
as in the West. In our sixth episode, this was shown in the way the nervous system was 
conceptualised differently in Western and in Chinese medicine, and in the different terms to refer to 
parts of the body and to its functioning. This should warn us about a scientistic attitude and 




4. Evidence and contrastive focus 
The septet presented in section 2, and then analysed in section 3, reveal many issues of interest to 
those thinking about mechanisms. While we would like to follow them with a detailed and 
exhaustive theoretical discussions of the issues, we will restrict ourselves to a discussion of just two 
of them. The first – evidence of mechanism – is a hotly disputed issue in the current debate. We will 
develop our account of evidence of mechanism in medicine from the six episodes will be a useful 
contribution. The second – contrastive focus – has not (we think) received sufficient attention from 
philosophers interested in mechanisms. We therefore highlight it here by way of raising interest in it 
as a research problem more widely. 
 
We begin by considering evidence, reasoning, and narratives in medicine. As the aspirin example 
suggests, mechanisms do not typically appear as ready-made pieces of knowledge. A great deal of 
work is needed in order to acquire and establish knowledge of mechanism. Here, the notion of 
evidence plays a crucial role. We borrow from Illari the definition of evidence of mechanism. She – 
and we – take evidence of mechanisms as being  
 
“[…] evidence of the actual existence of the postulated mechanism linking 
cause and effect.” (Illari 2011a: 120) 
 
While schematic, this definition is sufficiently clear to warrant some initial clarification regarding our 
thoughts about the use of mechanisms in medicine as evidence. What is at stake, in fact, is a 
distinction between evidence of mechanism and mechanistic reasoning, around which substantial 
disagreement exists. For instance, Howick et al define mechanistic reasoning as follows: 
 
“[…] the inference from mechanisms to claims that an intervention 
produced a patient-relevant outcome. Such reasoning will involve an 
inferential chain linking the intervention (such as antiarrhythmic drugs) 
with the outcome (such as mortality).” (Howick et al 2010: 434).i 
 
We take this to mean that mechanistic reasoning would involve making a clinical decision about the 
likely efficacy or harms of a medical intervention just by thinking about mechanisms. We do not 
endorse this way of using mechanisms to make medical decisions as a normative aspiration. Nor do 
we think it is a good description of the generality of medical practice (it seems hard to connect to 
our episodes). We instead think that reasoning about mechanisms alone is highly unlikely to make 
for reliable clinical inferences. As we have argued in other places (Clarke et al 2013; 2014), a kind of 
pragmatic evidential pluralism featuring some contribution from evidence of relevant mechanisms 
may instead help make better medical inferences. According to this view, evidence of mechanism 
participates, along with other kinds of relevant evidence such as that produced by randomised 
clinical trials, in various inferential practices. For the purposes of this chapter, though, it suffices to 
note that our evidence of mechanism is just one kind of evidence (amongst many), rather than the 
ambitious and free-standing mechanistic reasoning discussed by Howick et al. Along with Solomon 
(2015: 123-4), we therefore note that evidence of mechanism and mechanistic reasoning cannot be 
used interchangeably.ii  
 
A further distinction that we wish to draw is between evidence of mechanism and narratives. While 
the role of narratives in medicine (see Kleinman 1989; Greenlagh, 1999; Montogomery, 2006) and in 
science more generally (Roth 1988, 1989) is a topic that deserves more philosophical attention than 
it actually gets, it is important to note that we think there is a difference between evidence of 
mechanism and of the narrative(s) that may be used to describe, present, discuss, or criticize said 




It’s possible to use (empirically grounded) narratives to describe mechanisms, but that is not the 
same thing as saying that mechanisms just are narratives (see also Chapter 34). We think that any 
scientific result that is expressed in ordinary language can be understood as a narrative, without the 
converse assertion that all scientific results are just narratives. More positively, we think that there 
are standardized rules that govern the relation between a result and its narratives, which supply 
rigid structure on the presentation of those narratives. Consider how a scientific article must present 
a research question, the data, the analyses, and the results.  
 
We turn now to our second main point.  One aspect that many mechanisms in the episodes above 
share is contrastive focus. Mechanisms, as also discussed elsewhere in this volume (see Chapter 16), 
help answer the question ‘How does C cause E?’. Medicine is no exception to this use of mechanisms. 
Typically, emphasis is given to those characteristics of mechanisms (most notably, organization) that 
participate in explaining how C causes (in the sense of producing) E.  
 
In this section, though, we want instead to draw attention to another way that we might interpret 
the question ‘How does C causes E?’. Rather than give an answer that highlights the productive 
continuity that obtains between C and E, we might instead give an answer that explains why our C 
causes E rather than E1, or that C, rather than C1 causes E. This is the question of contrastive focus, 
which has been fairly extensively discussed in relation to causality (Dretske 1972, Schaffer 2005, 
Northcott 2008). Here, we aim to show that attention to contrastive focus is key to several 
inferential practices in medicine, and that dealing with questions of contrastive focus often involve 
thinking about mechanisms, in different ways, also illustrated by the septet of episodes. We 
highlight here two specific aspects of the contrastive focus: (i) normal vs pathological and (ii) 
biological vs social. Simply put, the idea is that the aspects of contrastive focus we discuss here 
concern (i) different mechanisms describing normal or pathological behaviour and (ii) the factors – 
biological or social – that are at work in such mechanisms. 
 
To begin with, mechanisms that deal with the aetiology of pathology typically do so in a contrastive 
way with normal physiology (see also Chapter 8). For example, the mechanism that explains how 
infection with H. pylori leads to ulcers does so in a contrastive way with normal physiology (see the 
extremely thorough review by Kusters, van Vliet and Kuipers 2006 for further details). This means 
that we need a generic mechanism about normal physiology and a suitable contrastive model of a 
mechanism that explains pathogenic behaviour. Many experimental studies in bio-medicine are 
based on this idea – they effectively compare subjects that do and do not receive some intervention. 
The very same idea is at the basis of extrapolation from animal studies to humans (see e.g. Steel 
2007).  
 
This means that contrastive focus is at the basis of RCTs too. In fact, one way to use RCTs is precisely 
to differentiate between the effect E1 rather than E2, or between the role of C1 rather than C2. This 
adds to the recent debates on the role of mechanisms in RCTs. Specifically, according to EBM-
theorisers mechanisms play little if no role at all in establishing causal relations – a view challenged 
instead by supporters of ‘evidential pluralism’, namely the view that to establish causal relations one 
typically needs multifarious evidence (for a discussion, see Clarke et al 2014).  
 
The contrastive focus can also participate in establishing causal relations at the individual, single 
case, level, precisely using considerations about what is (thought to be) normal and what is not. This, 
however, is far from being an easy task, as testified by the several challenges of diagnosis. We shall 
focus here on just one challenge. To make a diagnosis in the single case we need to contrast it with 




There is no principled answer to this question. One problem has to do with finding mechanisms that 
are stable in sufficiently homogeneous reference classes. A reference class is homogenous when all 
its members have the same characteristics. This is usually not the case in medicine – we expect 
those in the reference class of ‘patients with heart disease’ to be suffering from a range of different 
conditions. Homogeneous reference classes – where all individuals have exactly the same conditions 
- are either very scarce, or very hard to find, in medicine. A notable example in this respect is the 
study of pathologies that frequently co-occur with other pathologies. As the HDL-raising drug 
example above shows, it can be extremely hard to unpick the contributions of different conditions 
with similar effects. In the HDL-raising case, we can presumably assume that isn’t just one 
mechanism at work, but several nested and interconnected mechanisms. This is because people 
using HDL-raising drugs have very different conditions, and most of the time multiple pathologies, 
not just heart disease. Consequently, the contrastive focus of mechanisms should not simply be in 
terms of differentiating the effect of a drug against a placebo. Instead, drugs should be tested taking 
these other mechanisms into account, including interactions with other drugs. 
 
The second aspect related to the contrastive focus is whether only biological factors should 
contribute to answering the question ‘How does C cause E?’. We encountered this issue in the 
asbestos example, where a relevant question is whether work place or other social factors are 
appropriate factors to be included in the aetiology of the disease. So, when we check for appropriate 
contrasts between reference classes we shouldn’t just consider bio-chemical factors (i.e. those bio-
chemical factors marking normal vs pathological behaviour), but also psycho-demo-socio-economic 
one. Abestosis is of course not the only case. Another example is epigenetics, which attempts to 
reconstruct the effect of the environment, including in utero events, at the genetic level even one 
generation later. The contrastive focus here might be with events that happened much earlier on in 
our lives, if not generations before. So the mechanisms of health and disease may be acting over 
long time spans, and the causes may reside in events that cannot be assessed at the time of 
diagnoses. Studies on the ‘Dutch famine’ of 1944-45 are a good case in point. According to these 
studies, the children of women that were pregnant during the famine are more susceptible to 
develop diseases such as obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular conditions, etc. Epigenetics attempts to 
shed light on the long-term mechanisms that, by affecting women during pregnancy, also affected 
their offspring even decades after birth (see Roseboom, de Rooij and Painter 2006 for an 
introduction).  
 
The health sciences (including sociology of health) have recognised since long time that health and 
disease are not independent of socio-economic factors (for an overview, see Kelly et al 2014). But 
this recognition is typically explicated in two ways. On the one hand, socio-economic factors are 
merely correlated with health and disease, and they are used to map which parts of the population 
are healthier and which are more ill. But here socio-economic factor do not actively participate in 
the production of health and disease. On the other hand, the action of psycho-socio-demo-economic 
factors is totally explained away by reducing them the action of bio-chemical factors. Here, a proper 
understanding of how these factors actively contribute to health and disease is missing. Differently 
put, the mechanisms of health and disease are not just bio-chemical or just socio-eco-psychological. 
They are most often mixed, a blend of those categories, and in need of further investigation within 
medicine and public health, and philosophy too. Most non-communicable diseases, from obesity to 
type-2 diabetes, alcohol-related diseases arguably require mixed mechanisms both for 
understanding and for intervening on their causes and effect (see also Kelly et al 2014).  Admittedly, 
these (and many others) are cases where what we don’t know exceeds by far what we know. And, 
precisely for this reason, thinking in terms of how mechanisms contribute to several inferential 







As shown by the above sextet of examples, we have a very broad and inclusive understanding of 
what medicine is and does. We hope that this will help redress part of the existing debates in 
philosophy of medicine, particularly for what we call the ‘narrow view of medicine’, held by a 
number of authors, both from medicine and from philosophy.  
 
For many philosophers in recent years, medicine has been largely synonymous with evidence-based 
medicine. This is perhaps an artefact, due to how philosophers of science came to pay attention to 
medicine. The establishment of evidence-based medicine as a dominant paradigm prompted a 
peculiar reaction in the philosophical community, which was captured by the iconic paper by John 
Worrall (2002). He asked: “What on earth was medicine based on before?” This might explain why 
so much attention was, since then, devoted to this sub-field of medicine. There is much more to 
medicine than evaluating the efficacy and harms of drugs. At the same time, particularly in the way 
that philosophical work on EBM intersects with other interests of analytic philosophers of science 
(particularly the philosophy of statistics) we see just why this narrowing might be both useful and 
comforting. However, when it comes to thinking about mechanisms, we worry about this 
narrowness, largely because it (we think) has led to the pre-eminence of a narrow set of related 
questions that are ostensibly about medicine, but are really about statistical inference in the context 
of the clinical trial: evidence, bias, and so on. In turn, this has led to a caricature of medical practice 
such that mechanisms are either a) described as playing a negligibly minor evidential role or b) are 
treated as a simple (but faulty!) alternative method of inference to the clinical trial. Both of these 
caricatures, we submit, are inaccurate. It is high time to broaden the scope of the debate, by looking 
at the very many practices in medicine, including, but not restricted, to EBM. 
 
The approach taken in this chapter points to a pluralistic account of medicine, and of mechanisms in 
medicine. This stems from the different ways in which mechanisms contribute to medical practices. 
It is in this sense that we have explored the applied epistemology of mechanisms in medicine. We 
submit that mechanisms are powerful conceptual tools for establishing and intervening on causal 
relations in medicine. However, we worry that insufficient attention has been paid to the different 
ways that an understanding of mechanisms can contribute to this applied epistemology. This is all 
the more important, because the philosophy of mechanisms itself became somewhat specialized, 
discussing mechanisms in specific, isolated domains: in biology, in psychology, or in sociology. But 
mechanisms, in medicine or elsewhere, are seldom intrinsically biological, psychological, or 
sociological. We hope that our approach to mechanisms in medicine will be an encouragement to 
start crossing the borders of these sub-fields in the philosophy of mechanisms. 
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i Howick also gave a similar formulation in a later solo article: “Mechanistic reasoning is an 
inferential chain (or web) linking the intervention (such as HRT) with a patient-relevant outcome, via 
relevant mechanisms.” (Howick 2011: 929) 
ii
 A brief clarification is in order here. We do not agree that our previous work (Clarke et al 2013; 2014) 
endorsed the equivalence of mechanistic reasoning and mechanistic evidence, as Miriam Solomon seems to 
suggest: “Although there are differences between Howick (2011b), Andersen (2012), and Clarke et al. (2013), 
they all share the assumption that mechanistic reasoning should be regarded as mechanistic evidence, 
moreover, evidence that has a place in the hierarchy. This is an assumption that I challenge.” (Solomon 2015: 
120) 
